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An Integrated Incentive Framework for
Mobile Crowdsourced Sensing
Wei Dai, Yufeng Wang , Qun Jin, and Jianhua Ma
Abstract: Currently, mobile devices (e.g., smartphones) are equipped with multiple wireless interfaces and rich builtin functional sensors that possess powerful computation and communication capabilities, and enable numerous
Mobile Crowdsourced Sensing (MCS) applications. Generally, an MCS system is composed of three components: a
publisher of sensing tasks, crowd participants who complete the crowdsourced tasks for some kinds of rewards, and
the crowdsourcing platform that facilitates the interaction between publishers and crowd participants. Incentives are
a fundamental issue in MCS. This paper proposes an integrated incentive framework for MCS, which appropriately
utilizes three widely used incentive methods: reverse auction, gamification, and reputation updating. Firstly, a
reverse-auction-based two-round participant selection mechanism is proposed to incentivize crowds to actively
participate and provide high-quality sensing data. Secondly, in order to avoid untruthful publisher feedback about
sensing-data quality, a gamification-based verification mechanism is designed to evaluate the truthfulness of the
publisher’s feedback. Finally, the platform updates the reputation of both participants and publishers based on their
corresponding behaviors. This integrated incentive mechanism can motivate participants to provide high-quality
sensed contents, stimulate publishers to give truthful feedback, and make the platform profitable.
Key words: mobile crowdsourced sensing; incentive mechanism; reverse auction; gamification; reputation updating
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Introduction

Crowdsourcing has emerged as an effective way to
perform tasks that are easy for humans but remain
difficult for computers. Nowadays, smart phones are
ubiquitous and widely used around the world. Rich
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sensors (e.g., GPS, accelerometer, camera, etc.) are
built into these devices, and they have multiple radios
(e.g., WiFi, cellular, etc.). These enable individuals
to sense, collect, process, and distribute peoplerelated data at any time and place. Naturally, the
mixing of smartphone-based mobile technologies and
crowdsourcing offers vaster resources of computation
than previously available, and leads to a new paradigm
called Mobile Crowdsourcing Sensing (MCS)[1] .
There exist numerous MCS applications in various
fields, ranging from sharing prices of costumer goods[2] ,
to monitoring various aspects of the urban environment,
such as air pollution. For example, in order to deal with
the issues engendered by urbanization’s rapid progress,
such as traffic congestion, energy consumption, and
pollution, it has been proposed to tackle these issues
by using data collected by crowds[3] . Regardless of the
characterization given by various MCS applications,
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three common components are present: the publishers
who have sensing tasks to be outsourced to the
mobile participants; the mobile participants who
complete sensing tasks and offer sensed content to
publishers; and the platform (usually cloud-based) that
facilitates the interactions between mobile participants
and publishers, including publishing tasks, selecting
working participants (e.g., through reverse auction),
monitoring participant task enforcement, and auditing
publisher feedback.
Incentive mechanisms play an important role
to guarantee a stable scale of participants, and
to improve the accuracy/coverage/timeliness of the
sensing results. Along this line, a considerable amount
of research has been conducted recently, ranging
from experimental studies to theoretical solutions
and practical applications, aiming at providing more
comprehensive incentive procedures and protecting the
interests of different system stakeholders.
Many up-to-date surveys have summarized the
taxonomy and applications of incentive mechanisms
in MCS systems. In Ref. [4], the incentive taxonomy
is divided into two parts, based on the purpose
of the existing mechanisms: application-specific and
general-purpose incentive mechanisms. Furthermore,
incentive strategies research can also be divided
into two categories: user-centric and platform-centric
methods[5] . User-centric approaches focus on how
to recruit more users and improve their motivation.
Reference [6] proposed a mechanism named “Top-k
rule” in a reverse auction, to have individuals participate
in a pre-qualification stage. Bidders with top-k qualities
were selected for the contest. The selected participants
paid an entry fee for participation, then used their
data for bidding; the platform selected the winner and
rewarded him/her. Platform-centric approaches focus
on how to improve the information gain of the platform
and reduce overall sensing costs. For example, Luo
et al.[7] aimed at maximizing the received contribution
and profit for the platform. They argued that since all
participants contributed their data, all of them should
be paid some monetary reward as an incentive to offset
their sensing cost, and keep them contributing to future
tasks. This is termed an “all-pay auction” scheme.
However, these works have some weak points: First,
they only investigated the utility of partial roles in MCS,
i.e., the utility to participants and the platforms’ profit.
The behavior of the third component, the publisher,
is not examined at all, especially when publishers
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must evaluate data quality. Second, they only deal
with individuals’ incentives to participate, ignoring how
to incentivize publishers to provide truthful feedback.
Third, as described in Ref. [5], task publishers and
platforms should be treated separately, since in practice
they are two different independent economic entities.
The same task publisher may send tasks to different
platforms in a nearby area, and similarly these platforms
can recruit help from different groups of participants
based on different sets of collected sensory data. Most
existing research combines platforms with publishers.
To address the above issues, this paper proposes a
novel incentive framework for MCS, which smoothly
integrates three widely popular incentive methods:
reverse auction, gamification, and reputation updating.
The proposed incentive mechanism can motivate
participants to provide high-quality sensory data
reports, stimulate publishers to give truthful feedback
about the quality of collected data, and make platforms
profitable.
This paper is organized as follows. Related work
is discussed in Section 2. Section 3 provides the
details of our proposed incentive framework, including
reverse-auction-based two-round participant selection,
gamification-based verification,
and reputation
updating for participants and publishers. Theoretical
analysis of the proposed mechanism is offered in
Section 4. Finally, we briefly conclude this paper.

2

Related Work

Incentive rewards used in various applications are
different. Some are designed to directly pay participants
money as a reward, while others aim to reward them
psychologically. In Ref. [8], the incentive rewards are
divided into three categories: entertainment, services,
and money. In this paper, we simply classify available
incentive rewards into two categories: monetary and
non-monetary, as shown in Fig. 1.
2.1

Monetary rewards

Paying for sensed data in crowd sensing tasks is the
most intuitive incentive, as it turns sensed data into
Incentive rewards
Monetary

Non-monetary

Credit

Fig. 1

Intrinsic Ranking
incentives

Different kinds of incentives in existing applications.
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goods in a free market. Any user who would like to
make some money can sell her sensed data for crowd
sensing tasks.
Amazon Mechanical Turk is a famous platform that
serves as a programmatic interface for tasks that are
easier for humans than for machines, and most people
consider it a labor market[9] . Medusa is a platform that
provides abstractions for specifying the steps required
to complete a crowd sensing task[10] . Both platforms
use monetary rewards to implement their incentive
schemes, where fees are paid for each task in order to
compensate contributors who complete the task. In the
literature, auction-based mechanisms are mostly used to
reduce the sensing cost of the publishers and improve
the quality of sensing results. However, once money
is involved, designing an efficient price negotiation
procedure, and ensuring payment become the major
issues.
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participation selection method, and did not give
clear procedures for implementing gamification and
reputation updating. This paper significantly extends
our previous work in the following ways: designing a
reverse-auction-based two-round participant selection
mechanism that can effectively exclude malicious
participants, providing detailed procedures for
reputation updating for participants and publishers, and
offering a theoretical analysis of the properties of our
proposal.

3

Proposed Incentive Framework

As described in Ref. [1], generally, three stakeholders
are involved in an MCS system: crowd participants,
task publishers (i.e., crowdsourcer), and a
crowdsourcing platform. Our proposed incentive
mechanism framework, as shown in Fig. 2, pertaining
Participant(s)

2.2

Platform

Non-monetary rewards

Publisher

Reverse auction

Non-monetary rewards consist of credit, intrinsic
incentives, and ranking. For instance, TruCentive
focuses on encouraging participants to contribute highquality Parking Availability (PA) information, and
preventing malicious participants from spamming the
parking service with high volumes of useless data[11] .
TruCentive uses system credits as incentives. Intrinsic
incentive factors can include mental satisfaction gained
from performing the crowdsourced activities, selfesteem, personal skill development, and knowledge
sharing through crowdsourcing (e.g., Wikipedia)[12] .
Reputation is a special kind of ranking incentive.
Reputation score, based on both the quality of
contributions and the trust of participants, is calculated
for each participant as a result of the trust ratings
assigned to him[13] . The main purpose of using nonmonetary rewards is to obtain accurate sensory data
and avoid malicious participants. In comparison with
monetary rewards that reflect the transient quality of
the sensing data, non-monetary rewards, especially
reputation, are rather long-term accumulated metrics for
both participants and publishers.
Our paper takes both monetary and non-monetary
rewards into consideration in designing an integrated
incentive framework for MCS. Our previous work
proposed an incentive mechanism, QuaCentive, that
simultaneously exploited monetary (i.e., reserve
auction) and non-monetary rewards (i.e., gamification
and reputation)[12] . However, it only offered a simple

Task assignment,
deposit payment
First-round selection
Bid bi
Second-round selection
Send sensing data
Calculate the
trust of data
Todi

Send data to
publisher

Bad evaluation rating epu
Good evaluation rating
Gamiﬁcation
Recruit n gamers
Evaluation on data eg
Pay each gamer reward c
Comparison of eg
and epu
Truthful
evaluation, refund
money
False evaluation,no
refund

Pay reward to
participant

Reputation
updating
Update reputation of
i
participant i REpa

Fig. 2

Update reputation of
publisher REpu

The flowchart of our proposed incentive framework.
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to all three players, is composed of three components:
a reverse-auction-based two-round participant selection
process, gamification-based verification, and reputation
updating for participants and publishers. These three
components are described below.
 The reverse-auction component completes task
assignment and deposit of payments, selection
and recruitment of participants, calculation of
trustworthiness of data, and publisher feedback
about the quality of sensing data.
 In gamification, after participants upload data
and publishers evaluate the quality of the data,
if the quality is bad, then the platform utilizes
gamification to recruit individuals that enjoy the
verification game to simply vote whether the
publisher’s rating is truthful, and then infers
appropriate evaluations of the data quality.
 The reputation updating component updates
participants’ and publisher’s reputation scores
according to the trustworthiness of the data, the
publisher’s feedback, and her credibility.
Now we describe the detailed operations of the
integrated incentive mechanism. For clarity, Table 1
lists the notations and their meanings, as used in this
paper.
3.1

Reverse auction

3.1.1

Task assignment and deposit payment

A publisher “buys” a sensing service from the
crowdsourcing platform, through paying a deposit to
the platform. The amount of money paid by publishers
Table 1
Notation
Ppu I Pplat
mI n
bi I c
GI Si
REipa I REpu
threREpu
Todi
epu I eg
cREpu
xI ci

Notations and their meanings.

Description
Publisher’s deposit payment; platform’s profit
Number of participants; number of individuals
(i.e., gamers) in verification game
Bid value of participant i ; reward to each gamer
Expense used for gamification; ranking score of
participant i
Reputation of participant i ; reputation of
publisher (These values fall in the range [0,1])
Threshold reputation of publisher
Trustworthiness of data provided by participant i
Publisher’s feedback on data quality; gamers’
voting on data quality
Publisher’s reputation in current period
Publisher’s creditability; participant i ’s cost for
completing the crowdsourced task
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depends on the bid price of participants, platform
profits, and extra gamification expense. Note that
the deposit from the publisher will be refunded if
and only if the publisher reports that the service
failed (bad rating on sensed data), and the failure
report is successfully verified by the platform through
gamification. Therefore, the deposit payment itself is
only for the purpose of vouching.
A publisher provides a short description of the task,
describing its nature, time limitations, and so on. Note
that tasks should be divided into small pieces that can be
easy for mobile devices. Then, the platform distributes
task details to the crowd to recruit participants through
an open call.
3.1.2

Two-round selection and recruitment of
participants

In the first round, the platform selects participating
candidates according to the intuitive requirements of
the publisher, such as limitations of profession, age,
sex, etc. Note that, to understand the impact of
financial incentives on paid participants’ willingness
to behave maliciously, Ref. [14] conducted a series of
experiments, in which the authors hired crowd workers
via one crowdsourcing task (Attack task) to attack a
different crowdsourcing task (Target task). They found
that one-third of all workers were unwilling to attack
the Target task, despite high Attack task payments.
Thus, it may be possible to identify a subset of these
as ethical workers for tasks that require good behavior.
To fulfill the above goal of filtering potential malicious
participants, the platform can use an Ethical Gold test
to identify a subset of the ethical participants—for
example, they might ask participants to attack another
task, and then only move forward with participants who
refuse to do this job. Only participants who have passed
the first selection have the right to bid price on the task.
On second-round selection, the platform chooses
participants according to the ascending order of each
individual i ’s ranking price Si , defined by Eq. (1),
depending on the participant’s bid price bi and
reputation REipa .
Si D bi  .1

REipa /

(1)

Intuitively, under a constant bid price, if the value of
REipa is higher, Si will be lower, and the probability that
participant i will be selected increases. This explains
the effect of reputation.
Finally, the platform chooses m participants
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according to Si , where m satisfies

m
X

bi < Ppu . In

i D1

this step, the ranking price is only used in ranking for
selection; what participant i finally gets is still the bid
price.
3.1.3 Initial inference of trustworthiness of data
provided by each participant
Once the sensing data from the chosen participants
is received, the platform has to calculate the
trustworthiness of data provided by participant i .Todi /
before it is sent to the publisher. As in Ref. [13],
the quality of data, Qi , and the trustworthiness level
of participant, Ti , are combined to obtain a final
trustworthiness rating for the data. There has been much
research into data quality calculation, including outlier
detection and other issues[15] . Our system relies on
these state-of-the-art methods for determining Qi . Note
that Qi is in the range of [0, 1].
Ti is defined in Eq. (2):
n .TE \ PE/
Ti D
(2)
n .TE/
The set TE contains the Task’s required Expertise,
and PE is the set of a Participant’s Expertise; n.A/ is
the number of elements in set A.
The term Todi is defined in Eq. (3):
Todi D ˛  Qi C .1 ˛/  Ti
(3)
where ˛ is a constant that regulates the relative
importance of Qi and Ti . For example, ˛ can be set
to 0.7 if the platform thinks quality is more important.
Obviously, Todi is in the range of [0, 1].
3.1.4 Publisher’s feedback on data quality
Publisher gives an evaluation epu of the data. The
criterion for judging epu is shown below.
(
.0:6; 1:0; good rating;
epu 2
[0; 0:6;
bad rating:
If the publisher’s feedback is a good rating, then the
transaction is successfully completed, and the platform
pays participant i ’s bid price as a reward. Otherwise,
the platform carries out gamification to verify whether
the publisher’s evaluation is truthful or not.
3.2

Gamification-based verification

If the publisher’s feedback about data quality is to
give it a bad rating, there may exist two distinct
cases. The first is that the publisher’s evaluation is
ground-truth—that is, the data quality of participant
i is actually bad. The second is that the publisher
might want to use the sensing reports provided by

participants, but pay participants as little as possible—
probably through false-reporting the quality of sensing
reports. To solve this issue, this framework explicitly
utilizes gamification-based verification to infer whether
a publisher’s feedback is truthful. Gamification is
defined as the use of game design elements in non-game
contexts[16] . Specifically, the platform recruits n gamers
and gives each gamer a small reward, c. Then the
gamers offer an evaluation eg of the data quality through
voting. The comparison algorithm in pseudocode is
given below, to obtain a final evaluation of data quality,
e, through balancing the influences of the two ratings.
Note that the small reward c paid to each game
is optional for the platform. The reason for setting a
small reward lies in the following consideration. The
gamification used in our proposed framework could be
seen as one special interesting crowdsourced task, in
which the platform acts in the role of “publisher”, while
gamers play the role of “participants”. Furthermore,
it is observed that workers primarily seek fun in
gamification, but readily accept the financial incentive
as an additional stimulus[17] . Therefore, initially, this
setting can attract workers to complete a verification
task at a comparatively low pay rate, and then once
workers enjoy the game process, they will continue
playing with no expectation of financial compensation.
The basis for the comparison algorithm, as shown in
Algorithm 1, is explained as follows.
If eg 2 Œ0; 0:6, that implies both ratings (publisher’s
feedback and gamer verifications) are bad; in this
case, the publisher’s feedback is regarded as truthful.
In this case, the final rating is further computed as:
When  > 0:3, we take e D .eg C epu /=2 to smooth
the relatively large quantitative gap between the two
ratings; otherwise, let e D epu (implying that the gap
between two ratings is small enough to accommodate
this supposition).
If eg 2 .0:6; 1 and  > 0:4, that implies that gamers
gave a good rating, the publisher gave a bad rating,
and the gap between those ratings is large enough
for the gamers’ evaluation to be regarded as correct
(i.e., the publisher provided untruthful feedback). We
then let e D eg ; otherwise, if  2 Œ0:2; 04/, that means
the gap between those two ratings is moderate; we
then take e D .eg C epu /=2, and compare it with the
threshold between the good and bad rating, 0.6, to
infer whether the publisher’s feedback is truthful or
not. When  2 Œ0; 0:2/, we simply take e D epu . It
means that the gap is so small that we can trust the
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Algorithm 1:

Comparison algorithm framework

Input:
epu I = publisher’s evaluation on data */
eg I = gamers’ evaluation on data */
Output:
eI = actual evaluation that will be used in participant’s
reputation updating */
rating; /* whether publisher’s feedback is truthful */
1: LET  D eg epu ;
2: IF eg 6 0:6
3:
IF  > 0:3
4:
e D .eg C epu /=2; rating=truthful;
5:
ELSE
6:
e D epu I rating=truthful;
7: ELSE
8:
IF  > 0:4
9:
e D eg ; rating=untruthful;
10:
IF  > 0:2 AND  < 0:4
11:
e D .eg C epu /=2;
12:
IF e 6 0:6
13:
rating=truthful;
14:
ELSE
15:
rating=untruthful;
16: ELSE
17:
e D epu ; rating=truthful;
18: END IF

publisher’s feedback.
Through this comparison algorithm, the platform can
infer whether the publisher’s feedback is truthful or not.
If the publisher’s rating is truthful, the publisher will
have a refund of .bi C n  c/, which means the publisher
does not have to pay the extra expense of gamification;
otherwise, a refund is not given, and the publisher’s
actual payment will be .bi C bi  p C 2  n  c/, in which
the first term bi is the reward to participant i, the second
term bi  p is the profit of the platform, one n  c is the
expense of gamification, and another n  c is the penalty
imposed on the publisher for providing false feedback.
In summary, after gamification, we can get the value
of e (correct evaluation of data quality) and know
whether the publisher is truthful or not.
3.3

Reputation updating

After transactions, as shown in Fig. 3, the platform
will update both the participants’ and the publisher’s
reputation.
Updating Participant i’s reputation REipa : This
depends on the trustworthiness of data, Todi , and
the effect of the final rating on data quality, E. The
term Todi comes from the reverse auction phase. E

From reverse
auction
Input trust of data of
participant i (Todi)
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From gamiﬁcation
Input various ratings
REpu, epu, and e
Calculate the eﬀect of
ﬁnal rating E (Eq. (4))

Input the creditability
of publisher x
Gomperz function
Calculate the current reputation
of publisher cREpu (Eq. (6))
Sliding window average

Update the reputation of i
participant I, REpa (Eq. (5))
Output the reputation of
participant i
(a) Reputation updating for participants

Calculate the average reputation
of publisher REpu (Eq. (7))
Output the reputation of
publisher
(b) Reputation updating for publisher

Fig. 3 Reputation updating procedures for participants and
publisher.

characterizes how the final rating of data quality affects
participant i ’s reputation, which is given in Eq. (4).
Specifically, participant i ’s reputation, REipa , is updated
as shown in Eq. (5).
8
epu  REpu ;
publisher’s rating is good;
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ .1 e/  REpu ; publisher’s rating is bad
<
ED
but truthful;
ˆ
ˆ
ˆ e  .1 REpu /;
publisher’s rating is bad
ˆ
ˆ
:
but untruthful
(4)
where e is the data quality evaluation obtained through
the comparison algorithm above.
REipa C .Todi threTod/  k1 C E  k2
REipa D
(5)
1 C .Todi threTod/  k1 C E  k2
The term threTod is the predefined threshold value
determined by the platform. If the value Todi is greater
than threTod, that implies that the trustworthiness of
participant i ’s data is high, which will have a positive
effect on participant i ’s reputation. k1 and k2 are
constants defined by the platform to adjust the speed
of reputation updating and are less than 1.
Updating the publisher’s reputation REpu : This
mainly depends on the publisher’s creditability, x,
which, in turn, is decided by whether the publisher’s
feedback is truthful. In our paper, creditability x is
defined by Eq. (6).
n.truthfulrating/ n.untruthfulrating/
xD
(6)
n.totalrating/
where n.truthfulrating/ denotes the number of truthful
ratings made by the publisher, including the number
of good ratings and the number of bad ratings that are
verified by the platform as truthful; n.untruthfulrating/
is the number of false ratings, as judged by the
platform through gamification; n .totalrating/ is the
total number of feedback values provided by the
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publisher. Obviously, the value of x ranges from 1
to 1.
The platform calculates the publisher’s current
reputation, cREpu , using a Gomperz function[18] , shown
as Eq. (7).
x
cREpu D eˇ e
(7)
where ˇ and are function parameters.
Finally, we update the publisher’s reputation by
means of a sliding window average, as in Eq. (8).
REpu D ˛  REpu C .1 ˛/  cREpu
(8)
where ˛ is a constant defined by the platform.
The reputation score plays an important role in the
whole mechanism; thus, both stakeholders (participants
and publishers) will try to behave honestly, to get a high
reputation ranking.

4

Theoretical Analysis

In this section, we analyze the properties of integrated
incentive framework from the viewpoints of three
stakeholders in MCS: participant, publisher, and
platform.
Table 2 gives the payoff matrix between the platform
and a publisher. Note that rows indicate the publisher’s
feedback on sensing data quality. The columns show
whether the publisher’s feedback is truthful or not,
arbitrated by gamification-based verification. For each
of the 2-tuples, the first element is the publisher
payment and the second is the platform profit.
p
Successful transactions are marked with a . The utility
of participant i is simply related to whether the sensing
data transaction is successful or not: if successful,
utility ui D bi ci ; otherwise, ui D ci .
4.1

From participants’ viewpoints:
rationality and influence of
updating

Individual
reputation

Individual rationality: Assuming gamification-based
verification can accurately detect publishers’ false
reporting with probability approaching 1, then each
participant i who provides high-quality data will have
a non-negative utility: ui > 0.
Table 2
Platform
Truthful
Game-based verification
Untruthful

When a transaction is successful (there are two
p
successful transactions, marked with a , in Table 2),
then participant i will get bid price bi that is larger
than its cost ci . However, if the transaction fails, which
means participant i sends low-quality data, he may not
only receive a bad rating from the publisher, which will
decrease his reputation, but also get no bid price from
the publisher, that is, he has to bear the loss on his
own (the utility becomes ci < 0/. Therefore, when
the gamification-based verification can accurately judge
a publisher’s reporting as false, with the probability
limited to 1, the optimal strategy of each participant is
to provide high-quality data.
Reputation influence: Reputation plays an important
role in ranking price and prevents malicious attacks.
Note that the second-round selection in a reverse
auction uses ranking price Si D bi  .1 REipa / to
select participants. Obviously, if the reputation score is
higher, then the possibility of being selected is higher,
which will, in return, result in positive revenue for
selected participants.
Reputation can be a good way to avoid malicious
attacks. For example, a malicious participant with
low reputation has to bid lower (probably lower than
his cost) to be chosen. Even if low bidding could
make him be selected, he still cannot get his bid price,
due to the fact that the publisher has a truthful bad
rating on his bad-quality data. Meanwhile, he would
face a loss of compensation for his sensing, and a
decrease of reputation. Figure 4 graphically illustrates
the change trend of a participant’s reputation updating
characterized by Eq. (5). For clarity, we let a D .Todi
threTod/  k1 C E  k2 in Eq. (5).
In Fig. 4, we observe that the curves are
qualitatively concave, that is, the absolute reputation
score monotonically increases, but the incremental
speed becomes less and less, which represents a
diminishing marginal return. This trend perfectly fits
the reputation updating rule in real social life: We
can have a quick increase at the beginning, while the
incremental speed slows down when the reputation

Payoff matrix between platform and publisher.
Publisher
Good rating (without gamification)
Bad rating (gamification required)
!
!
bi  .1 C p/ ; p
bi  p;
bi  p
bi  p n  c
!
!
bi  .1 C p/ ; p
bi  .1 C p/ C 2  n  c; p
bi  p
bi  p C n  c
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Fig. 4 Illustration of the updating trend of a participant’s
reputation.

score is high. In practice, the platform can adjust
the incremental speed through changing the parameters
threTod, k1 , and k2 .
Figure 5 graphically illustrates the shape of
publisher’s reputation updating characterized by Eq.
(7), with the change of publisher’s creditability.
Obviously, it has an ’S’ shape (sigmoid curve), which
is caused by the intrinsic property of the Gomperz
function used in Eq. (7). That is, initially, the curve
is convex (i.e., incremental speed increases), and when
passing a specific tipping point, the curve becomes
concave (i.e., diminishing marginal return). The
underlying rationale for the special shape lies in that,
in our incentive framework, the value of the publisher’s
creditability ranges from 1 to 1; therefore, this ‘S’
curve can make the publisher quickly jump out of the
trap of negative creditability, and, while it is not easy,
build and maintain a very positive reputation with the
increase in its creditability.
Score of publisher’s current reputation
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Fig. 5 Illustration of the updating trend of a publisher’s
reputation.
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From a publisher’s viewpoint: Budget
feasiblility, truthful feedback about quality of
sensed data, influence of reputation

Budget feasibility and truthful feedback about
quality of sensed data: The incentive mechanism
needs to be budget feasibility for a publisher:
actualPpu 6 advancePpu . That is, the actual payment
actualPpu should not be larger than the deposit amount
advancePpu (advanced payment). Moreover, truthful
feedback about data quality is the publisher’s best
strategy.
The proposed mechanism can satisfy properties of the
budget feasibility and truthful feedback.
The publisher’s expected payment Ppu is defined by
Eq. (9).
m
X
bi C Pplat C G
(9)
Ppu D
i D1

where bi represents the bid price of participant i,
Pplat represents platform profits, and G represents the
expense of gamification.
Pplat is defined in Eq. (10):
m
X
Pplat D
bi  p;
i D1

(
pD

.1
k;

REpu /  k; REpu > threREpu I
REpu < threREpu

(10)

where k is a constant, representing the regular
commission fee charged by the platform; threREpu is
the threshold value set by the platform. Equation (10)
denotes that if the reputation of publisher is higher than
the threshold threREpu , then the platform will charge the
publisher a commission fee with a discount: the higher
the reputation, the larger the discount.
Assume in a task that the number of good ratings is
m1 , the number of bad but truthful ratings is m2 , the
number of untruthful bad ratings is m3 , and m D m1 C
m2 C m3 represents the number of total ratings in this
task. Then the publisher’s creditability is given as x D
m1 C m2 m3
.
m
In our framework, the publisher first pays a deposit
advancePpu to the platform; then the platform selects m
participants under the budget constraint of advancePpu .
We then have the following inequality:
m
m
X
X
advancePpu >
bi CPplat CG D
bi .1 C p/CG
i D1

i D1

(11)
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Let x0 be the publisher’s creditability in the former
task. It is reasonable to assume that the platform can
estimate the gamification expense G in the current
task based on that of the former task. We have G D
.1 x0 /  m  n  c. Therefore, the platform can select m
participants, such that Inequality (11) is satisfied.
In Table 2, when the publisher gives a good rating
to participant i ’s data, his payment is .bi C bi  p/,
including a reward bi to participant i and a commission
fee paid to the platform, bi  p. When the publisher
gives a bad rating to data, if it is verified as truthful
by gamification, he does not pay both a reward to
participant i and the expense of gamification, but he
still has to pay a commission fee to platform, while
the platform bears the expense of gamification n 
c. Otherwise, that is, if his feedback is verified as
untruthful, the publisher has to pay bi .1 C p/C2nc,
apart from a reward to participant i and a commission
fee to the platform, and he must also pay n  c as
the expense of gamification, and another n  c as the
platform’s penalty for his false feedback. Thus, we can
calculate the actualPpu with Eq. (12).
m2
m1
X
X
bi  pC
bi .1 C p/ C
actualPpu D
m3
X

i D1

bi  .1 C p/ C m3  2  n  c D

i D1

bi C

m
X

bi  p C .1

x/  m  n  c

(12)

i D1

Then, applying Inequality (11) and Eq. (12), we
m2
X
bi C .x x0 / 
obtain advancePpu actualPpu >
i D1

m  n  c:
Therefore, if the publisher’s current creditability is
not smaller than his former value, the value of .x x0 /
is positive, and his actual payment will always be
smaller than his advance payment (i.e., deposit money).
Moreover, in order to pay less money under a budget
constraint, the best strategy for the publisher is to
provide truthful feedback.
Reputation influence: In Eq. (10), when the
publisher’s reputation is higher than the threshold
determined by the platform, the platform will charge the
publisher a discounted commission fee. If the publisher
wants to reduce the cost of getting high-quality data, he
should increase his reputation. Moreover, the REpu is
also a weighting coefficient in a participant’s reputation
updating (see Eq. (4)), so it can be an intrinsic
motivation.

From platform’s viewpoint: Condition of being
profitable

According to Table 2, the actual platform profit can be
computed by Eq. (13).
m1 Cm
2 Cm3
X
Pplat D
bi  p C m3  n  c m2  n  c (13)
i D1

In order to make a platform profitable, we consider
the worst scenario: All of the sensed data are bad
quality, and the publisher gives a bad rating for these
data truthfully. In this condition: m2 D m; m1 D
worst
m3 D 0; and the platform profit becomes: Pplat
D
m
2
X
bi p m2 nc. If the platform wants to be profitable,
i D1

one good way is to recruit an appropriate number
of gamers with suitable rewards that satisfy n  c 6
worst
mini fbi  pg. Thus Pplat
is always a positive value. In
practical cases, the reward to each gamer is always 0,
for gamers are mainly looking for fun in gamificationbased verification, and do not care about small rewards.
Therefore, the platform is always profitable for Pplat >
worst
Pplat
> 0.

5

i D1

i D1
m1X
Cm3

4.3

Conclusion

Generally, an MCS system usually pertains to three
stakeholders: task publishers, crowd participants,
and a crowdsourcing platform. All these roles are
rational, and attempt to maximize their utilities/profits.
Therefore, incentive is a fundamental issue in MCS.
However, most existing work only investigates the
utilities from separate viewpoints of partial roles in
MCS, i.e., a participant’s utility and/or a platform’s
profit. This paper proposes an integrated incentive
framework for MCS, which includes three components:
a reverse-auction-based two-round participant selection
mechanism, gamification-based verification of the
publisher’s feedback regarding the quality of data
provided by the crowd, and detailed procedures of
reputation updating for the participants and publisher.
Furthermore, we analyze the properties from the
viewpoints of these three stakeholders, and infer that
the integrated incentive mechanism framework can
motivate participants to provide high-quality data,
stimulate publishers to give truthful feedback, and make
a platform profitable.
Our work can be extended in the following ways:
Thorough experiments can be conducted to verify our
theoretical results. Moreover, the proposed incentive
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framework is still “off-line” and can only deal with
static scenarios. It will be interesting to investigate how
to accommodate dynamic factors in MCS systems (e.g.,
time constraints, individuals’ joining and leaving, etc.).
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